A predictable war (2013-11)

This is a brief introduction to the economic theories that can be deduced from the evolution of oil resources in the world. These theories have not been developed by economists, but by geologists and engineers specialized in oil extraction. The main thrust of their theories is that the entire economy is based on the primary sector (water, energy, building materials…) and therefore the primary sector drives the economy, and therefore history, in the long run. These theories offer an interesting point of view to explain wars, recessions and economic developments. Since they are materialist, they can be integrated into the materialist conception of history.

According to these geologists, we have experienced a first cycle of extraction starting at the beginning of the industrial revolution and ending during the first two world wars: this is the coal cycle. From 1800 to 1913, coal production grew by an average of 4.3% per year, apparently steadily ^[1]

Calculate from Table 1 of “World Commercial Energy Production”, Bouda Etemad, p. 6: (1235.7/10.6)^(1/113)-1= 4.3%.

. During the 19th century, coal gradually replaced almost all other primary energy sources: in 1913, it represented 92.6% of the market ^[2]

ibid.

. Then from 1913 to 1950, it is stagnation: 0.4% annual growth on average only ^[3]

ibid. (1445,0/1235,7)^(1/37)-1= 0,4%

. Oil then takes over.

The industrial production of oil begins in the second half of the 19th century at a steady growth rate: from 1890 to 1970, 7% on average ^[4]

ibid. (3309,4/14,3)^(1/80)-1=7%

. In 1950, oil already accounted for 30.3% of commercial primary energy (coal: 37.9%), and in 1970, 47.7% (coal: 31.3%). But by 1971 ^[5]

ASPO newsletter #23, p. 6.

the United States reached its peak oil (the point at which the level of extraction reaches its maximum and inexorably declines), and in 1987 ^[6]

ASPO newsletter #31, p. 9.

, it was the turn of the USSR. From 1970 to 1990, oil production nevertheless continued to grow, very irregularly, at an average rate of 1.6% per year ^[7]

“World commercial energy production”, ibid. (4551.5/3309.4)^(1/20)-1=1.6%

. Today the ASPO ^[8]

Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas.

predicts the peak of world production before 2020 ^[9]

ASPO, Jean Laherrere, Oil and Gas Forecasts 1900-2100, p. 16.

, followed by gas around 2030 ^[10]

ibid., p. 6.

.

The end of the coal cycle was marked by two world wars and the physical destruction of industry in the advanced countries (except for the United States). Why was the transition not peaceful?

In 1913, almost all industry was based on coal. Great Britain, which alone accounted for 38% of European coal production ^[11]

World Energy Production: 1800-1985, Bouta Etema & Jean Luciani, p. 189 : 249279,0/653918,3=38%

, dominated France ^[12]Alain Beltran French coal from 1914 to 1946, a limited modernization: “Until 1900, imports accounted for 33% of consumption, but the economic growth of the Belle Epoque, which was faster than … Continue reading and Italy ^[13]

It seems that there was no coal in Italy. Coal production: in 1914, not even 0.3% of that of Great Britain.

by its exports. Yet in 1913, Britain reached its coal peak, while Germany’s production continued to grow ^[14]

http://www.institut-strategie.fr/IHCC_14.htm incomplete source. By 1914, Germany was producing almost as much as Britain.

. In an imperialist economy, England is thus constrained to break Germany’s momentum, while Germany must instead break England’s monopoly. Imperialist rivalries in the processing and consumption sectors depend on primary rivalries in the extraction sector.

For example, Germany took Italy into its fold as soon as its coal became cheaper than Britain’s (Rome-Berlin axis) ^[15]

ASPO newsletter #73, art. 787, p. 5.

. The sabotage of the northern mines during the Great War proceeded from the same logic: to make France dependent on German coal in the long term ^[16]

French coal from 1914 to 1946, a limited modernization p. 3

.

For their part, the United States, endowed with significant oil reserves, had plenty of time to make their energy transition without risking an invasion of their territory (favorable geographic position). It should also be noted that the coal power of the United States was also enormous: 1st exporter, 1st world producer ^[17]

http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ingeo_0020-0093_1936_num_1_6_6571 .

.

The domination of Europe by the most powerful imperialist became all the more urgent as the United States completed its energy transition. It was also necessary to conquer new oil resources outside Europe (North Sea oil was not discovered until 1958). This explains both the alliance and then the war of Germany against the USSR and the peace proposals of Germany to Great Britain as soon as France was invaded (Germany had proposed not to touch the British empire if it did not prevent it from carving out colonies in the former French empire and the USSR).

We must analyze the current wars in the Middle East as preparatory wars for the next energy transition. An energy transition takes place in two phases: first, the observation of a shortage of strategic raw materials, which cannot be replaced immediately. This shortage provokes wars for the reconquest of the zones where these raw materials are extracted, in order to limit, for its own imperialism and at the expense of others, its own decline. These wars are the equivalent of the First World War.

The second phase appears only after the partial development of new technologies, based on new raw materials. The imperialists realize that the raw materials they need are to be found in territories they do not dominate: the “division of the world” no longer corresponds to their strategic interests. These wars are of the same type as the Second World War.

If the revolution does not sweep away imperialism during the next energy transition, then there will be several wars of a magnitude that can only be compared to the First and Second World Wars.